Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders' value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal-agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier firms may offer higher total pay as compensation for the extra risk in equity stakes borne by risk-averse managers. Using long lags of stock price risk to capture exogenous firm risk, we confirm our conjecture and show that riskier firms are also more productive and more likely to be held by institutional investors, who are most able to influence compensation.
MANY BLAME WALL STREET COMPENSATION for the most significant economic crisis since the Great Depression. For instance, in his testimony to Congress on the Treasury budget on June 9, 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner argues, "I think, although many things caused this crisis, what happened to compensation and the incentives that created risk taking did contribute in some institutions to the kind of vulnerability we saw in this financial crisis" (emphasis added) 1 . As a result, U.S. policy makers have promoted reforms to tie pay to long-term performance and increase the say of shareholders in approving compensation and electing directors on compensation committees. The view that incentive misalignment contributed to the crisis is shared by many other governments as well.
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According to this narrative, pay, misaligned from long-term shareholder value because of managerial entrenchment, caused risk-taking. Firms like Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG with poorer governance and more misaligned pay packages than other firms ended up taking excessive risks with disastrous consequences. Thus, increasing shareholder rights and reforming the distorted incentives by clawing back pay to tie it to long-term firm performance will lead to less of this behavior. Anecdotes on the behavior of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers' CEOs lend some credence to this view. Academic research also provides support for managerial entrenchment and short-termism as potentially important factors in corporate behavior (see Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003) and Stein (2003) for reviews). This research, however, typically focuses on nonfinance firms and predates the financial crisis. There is also very little direct evidence for this entrenchment perspective among finance firms.
Given the importance of this issue, we believe it important to examine an alternative, nonentrenchment perspective on the relationship between pay and risk among financial firms. We show that a strong relationship between pay and risk can also emerge naturally in a classical principal-agent setting (as in, for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom (1979) ) in which investors optimally set incentive contracts, entrenchment is absent, and where firm or project risk is taken as exogenous and out of the manager's control. There is anecdotal evidence, which we confirm in our analysis below, that savvy institutional investors such as Bill Miller of Legg Mason, one of the largest mutual fund companies in the United States, overweighted and supported the most risky companies like Bear Stearns in their portfolios.
3 Such institutional investors with large blocks of shares of a company have typically been viewed in the literature as having more power to act like a principal that shapes and incentivizes its agent's effort and as less subject to behavioral biases than individual investors. Entertaining a classical setup thus seems to be a reasonable exercise ex ante.
Under our narrative, pay and risk are correlated not because misaligned pay leads to risk-taking, but rather because principal-agent theory predicts that riskier firms have to pay more total compensation than less risky firms to provide a risk-averse manager the same incentives. To induce a manager to exert effort and maximize firm value, the principal must provide that manager incentives or an ownership stake in the firm. For the same level of incentives or ownership stake, the manager at a riskier firm faces much more wealth uncertainty because her firm's stock price is more volatile. Since the manager is risk-averse, she prefers a less risky firm all else equal, unless of course she is compensated for bearing the additional risk that comes from working for a riskier firm. As such, to give the risk-averse manager the same incentives, a riskier firm has to pay more total compensation than a firm that is less risky.
and that the design of bonus schemes was not aligned with the interests of shareholders and the long-term sustainability of the banks." (UK House of Commons (2009) Of course, if it is more expensive for riskier firms to align managerial incentives using insider ownership stakes, then, all else equal, these firms may optimally not want to give as big an insider ownership stake as less risky firms. In practice, however, there are several reasons, which we elaborate on below, why even very risky financial firms would want their managers to have ownership stakes as large as those of managers of less risky firms. One important reason is that these firms rely on people with specialized skills (such as managing complex portfolios) and who wield significant influence over outcomes. When an agent has significant influence over outcomes, it is optimal to keep her working hard through strong incentives, as the gains to doing so offset the cost of paying her more. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that agents work hard at risky firms; investment banking jobs in particular have a reputation for long hours and difficult work conditions (Oyer (2008) ).
We test this hypothesis using data on executive compensation and risk for finance firms from 1992 to 2008. We begin by establishing that there is substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in residual compensation, which is defined as the total pay of top-five managers controlling for firm size and finance subindustry effects, where the subindustries are primary dealers, bank holding companies, and insurance companies. We adjust pay by these two factors as it is well known that pay scales with size (Gabaix and Landier (2008) ), and, as we show below, compensation varies considerably across the finance subindustries. We find that residual compensation is highly persistent over time, suggesting the presence of a firm fixed effect in pay levels. Firms with persistently high residual compensation include Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide, and AIG. Low or moderate residual compensation firms include firms such as Wells Fargo and Berkshire Hathaway.
We next establish that risk, measured either with a lag or in the year of its origin (the year the firm first had an IPO or was newly listed), significantly explains the cross-sectional variation in contemporaneous risk. In other words, there are also fixed differences in the riskiness of finance firms. In addition to stock return volatility, we use a firm's stock market beta to capture the heterogeneous risk profiles of financial firms. For instance, a firm's propensity to sell out-of-the-money puts or insurance on the stock market (i.e., to engage in tail risk) may not be entirely captured by stock return volatility. Ex post stock market betas in this instance may better gauge a firm engaging in tail risk since the firm is fine when the market does well and goes bust when the market does poorly.
We use lagged firm risk, as well as its origin risk, to capture the exogenous and permanent component of firm risk. 4 The thought experiment is one in which we compare the time t compensation of firms born with high risk with the time t compensation of firms born with low risk, holding size and industry constant. Importantly, we show that lagged or origin firm risk explains little R of the variation in insider ownership, or the degree of incentive provision, across firms. 5 As a result, the manager at the riskier firm has a similar level of incentive provision as his counterpart at a less risky firm and so faces much more uncertainty in his wealth.
Consistent with classical principal-agent theory, we find that, although insider ownership stakes are not correlated with firm riskiness, our residual compensation measure is strongly correlated with our lagged and origin measures of risk in the cross-section. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in a firm's lagged stock market beta is associated with a 0.27 standard deviation increase in residual compensation.
We next verify auxiliary implications of this classical theory. As we demonstrate in a variation of the principal-agent model below, one reason higher-risk firms give their managers the same incentives (i.e., same insider ownership) as less risky firms in equilibrium, even though doing so is more costly, is that the riskier firms might be more productive or profitable. We verify this rationale by showing that riskier firms are indeed more productive using a variety of measures such as return on assets, asset turnover, and total factor productivity. In a multiple regression of compensation on both firm risk and these measures of productivity, we find that both risk and productivity have significant explanatory power. It appears that risk and productivity are inextricably linked in financial services. 6 The fact that riskier firms are more profitable and provide the same incentives as less risky firms implies that a higher fraction of managerial pay at riskier firms is variable as opposed to fixed. We also verify this implication of classical theory for pay composition. In short, it appears that the key predictions of the classical theory of principal-agent contracting are verified in the data. Career rewards for working at high-risk firms are turbulent, and so risk and pay are correlated not because pay causes risk but because risk-averse managers require pay to keep them working at firms with higher risk. According to this view, the management teams of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide, and AIG were paid more than management at other firms as the strategies demanded by shareholders were fundamentally riskier. 5 In a review by Prendergast (2002) , only 4 of 26 studies of various contractual settings find a negative relationship between risk and ownership. A notable exception is Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) . Garen (1994) finds a weak negative effect relating slope and risk but a slightly positive effect for salary and risk. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) find small effects of exogenous risk on venture capital contracts while Becker (2006) finds that CEOs with higher wealth receive stronger incentives among Swedish firms. Among finance firms, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) find that finance firms with higher insider ownership stakes had poorer performance during the crisis, suggesting little relationship between insider ownership and firm risk. Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) show that stock option grants lead CEOs to take less borrowing and higher capital ratios but to undertake riskier investments. Laeven and Levine (2009) find that bank risk is higher among banks that have large owners with substantial stakes.
6 One reason might be measurement error of productivity. As we argue below, another interpretation is that firm risk is a natural measure of firm growth options, which are tied to productivity and hence should lead to steeper incentives for managers.
We also show that our pay-risk relationship is not due to entrenchment. In particular, we find that pay and risk are not correlated with ex ante measures of managerial power or entrenchment such as the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G Index and the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) E Index, as well as director independence. However, these proxies are imperfect as they mostly relate to takeover provisions, and there are other mechanisms for entrenchment. To address this limitation, we show that there is more institutional ownership for high-risk and high-residual compensation firms, and that they receive similar if not higher levels of analyst coverage as other firms. The idea is that entrenchment is more feasible when there is less transparency, for example, as in Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008) . As greater institutional presence and analyst coverage is typically thought to bring about more transparency, this suggests that our observed cross-sectional correlation between pay and risk is not driven by entrenchment. This institutional investor result also points to some investors understanding that these finance firms were risky.
Moreover, under the entrenchment narrative, entrenched firms consistently underperform in the cross-section since managers divert cash flows (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) ). If high-pay firms are entrenched firms, then we would see these firms consistently underperform. In contrast, if pay reflects compensation for risk, then we should see either no systematic underperformance, or overperformance during booms and underperformance during busts, depending on whether pay reflects idiosyncratic or systematic risk. Consistent with the idea that high-residual compensation firms are also high-beta firms in the cross-section, highresidual compensation firms are more likely to be in the tails of performance, with extremely good performance when the market did well-"yesterday's heroes"-and extremely poor performance when the market does poorly.
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Our approach complements existing literature in that it goes beyond providing evidence on whether there is too little pay-for-performance, as in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) . We build on the insight from the classical theory of contracting with risk-averse agents that incentive provision is more expensive for riskier firms. In equilibrium, agents are paid their outside option plus the so-called compensating differential, the sum of the disutility of effort and the utility cost of risk borne by the agent. In the language of contracting theory, the participation constraint adjusts so that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. To induce managers to participate in riskier firms with the same incentive provision as less risky firms, they need to be given higher total compensation. This generates the reverse causality of risk causing pay as opposed to pay causing risk.
We are not the first to use the individual rationality constraint to explain puzzling empirical findings on compensation. Oyer (2004) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) show that the participation constraint is important to R understanding why there is pay for luck in the time series and why there is broad-based used of employee stock option plans, as outside opportunities may co-vary with the market. But their analysis is different from ours, and our contribution focuses on a different phenomenon, namely, that incentive provision is more costly for higher risk firms. The role of risk aversion and compensation for bearing on-the-job risk in generating a positive correlation between total pay and risk has been largely understudied in the literature.
Our paper is organized as follows. We discuss the theoretical background in Section I to motivate our empirical analysis and the data in Section II. We present the results in Section III. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on future research in Section IV.
I. Hypothesis Development
To make our conjecture more precise, we recast a simple version of a static moral hazard model from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom (1979) while allowing for heterogeneity in the underlying productivity of different firms. Consider a firm whose outputx is a linear function of an agent's effort, a, and Gaussian noise,εßN(0,σ 2 ):
The parameter h reflects the agent's marginal productivity of effort, which may be a function of the risk of the firm, σ 2 , as well as other sources of heterogeneity. The agent cares about total pay less a positive, increasing, and convex cost of supplying effort, c(a), with c (0) = 0, and has exponential utility with constant absolute risk aversion γ . Effort is unobserved to the principal, but all other parameters are common knowledge. If we let s (x) = α + βx denote a linear sharing rule between the principal and the agent, this implies that the agent maximizes
The parameter β captures the agent's incentive slope and is her fractional ownership stake in the firm. Optimal effort is governed by the incentive compatibility constraint, which requires
Participation requires that the expected utility is at least the agent's reservation utilityū. Assuming this constraint binds, total pay is given by
The principal maximizes output net of payments to the agent subject to these two constraints, which leads to the familiar equilibrium piece rate
Our insight is that, if the equilibrium piece rate is insensitive to changes in risk, then the expected total compensation T must increase with risk, that is, if ∂β * /∂σ 2 = 0, then ∂ T * /∂σ 2 > 0. This situation arises in our model when the marginal productivity of the agent is positively correlated with the risk of the firm. For example, one may conjecture that, for risky firms like Bear Stearns, traders have a higher marginal impact on outcomes.
For concreteness, consider the classic case in which the cost of effort is quadratic, c (a) = a 2 /2. A necessary and sufficient condition for ∂β * /∂σ 2 = 0 is then
If the elasticity of the marginal productivity of effort with respect to risk is one-half, then we expect equilibrium incentive slopes not to vary with risk. High-risk firms are also high-productivity firms, and, although it is optimal to incentivize the manager to work hard at these firms through a higher slope β, the higher risk tempers this effect in equilibrium.
More generally, whenever ∂β * /∂σ 2 = 0, then, for a wide range of effort disutility functions c, total dollar compensation T must rise with σ 2 for two reasons. First, from the participation constraint, the principal must compensate the risk-averse agent more from a classical insurance motive. (If ∂β * /∂σ 2 < 0, this may not hold in equilibrium since the equilibrium slope may fall as firm risk rises.) Second, the principal needs to compensate the agent to work harder at the high marginal productivity firm. Formally, we have the following proposition. 
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that the conditions on the cost function in (i) are satisfied if c = da n for n > 1 and d > 0. In addition, the stronger conditions in (ii) are satisfied provided n ≥ 2 or c = exp(da) with d > 0.
Of course, if incentives increase with risk (∂β * /∂σ 2 ≥ 0), then total pay levels must rise even more strongly with risk.
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Proposition 1 provides the basis for the first set of empirical tests (Prediction 1) that we examine in this paper. Our strategy is to relate size and industryadjusted measures of total compensation T and slope β to lagged and origin measures of risk in the cross-section, as the prediction is primarily a crosssectional prediction about how firm risk explains pay. Adjusting for size and industry is important since the prediction of the model only holds for firms of equal scale or capital.
Our second test (Prediction 2) examines whether the marginal productivity of the agent is positively correlated with the risk of the firm by correlating measures of firm productivity with various proxies for lagged firm risk and origin risk. A positive correlation indicates that productivity rises with risk in the finance industry, and supports the rationale for why ownership is uncorrelated with risk in finance firms.
Our third testable implication (Prediction 3) is that a higher fraction of total pay at riskier firms is variable as opposed to fixed when ownership is uncorrelated with risk because of productivity. The intuition is that, if riskier firms are also more productive and more profitable, and they provide the same incentives as less risky firms, then the high value of those incentives drives down the fraction of pay that is fixed. We prove this relationship for the case of quadratic effort in the Appendix. Here, we state it as the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the disutility of effort is quadratic and ∂β ∂σ 2 = 0. Then the fraction of pay that is fixed declines with risk:
Finally, our fourth set of predictions (Prediction 4) centers around the entrenchment theory, which posits that high pay and high risk are rooted in governance problems. The premise of this model is that managers have subverted the optimal contracting process by capturing the board. Managers extract rents by setting the level of pay as high as possible (without invoking public outrage), divert cash flows to private benefits, and insulate their pay from outside forces that are informative about effort.
This view has found popularity among both policy makers and academics (see, for example, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) , Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) ). We phrase this view in terms of our model by noting that the participation constraint may not bind; more generally, the total pay of the manager equals
Alternatively, agents may influence output a great deal, so that principals of both risky and lessrisky firms may find it optimal to always induce maximum effort, as in Edmans and Gabaix (2011) . In their model, where output is multiplicative in agent effort and the agent has constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) preferences over consumption, large firms may find it optimal to always induce maximum effort from the agent, making the incentive slope independent of risk so that pay rises with risk. Axelson and Bond (2014) show that high pay combined with firing incentives may be the cheapest way for a principal to incentivize an agent in high-stakes industries, in an argument similar to the classical efficiency wage argument.
where V measures the surplus value and π is a measure of the agent's power. According to the entrenchment theory, more entrenched managers have higher power π and pay themselves more, generating a positive relationship between total pay T and proxies for managerial power. If this is the first-order determinant of pay in the cross-section, then all else equal we should see a positive correlation between measures of power and total pay, while measures of monitoring and transparency such as institutional ownership and analyst coverage should be negatively correlated with total pay. Furthermore, if powerful managers take more risk (if π is positively correlated with σ 2 ), a positive correlation between total pay and risk σ 2 would reflect an omitted variable of entrenchment. In this case, proxies for entrenchment should mediate the observed correlation between total pay and risk.
II. Data and Variables
Our sample consists of financial firms in the intersection of ExecuComp and CRSP-Compustat from 1992 to 2008. We identify three groups of financial firms. We first construct a group of primary dealers by hand-matching a historical list from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with PERMCOs from our CRSP file. We then use SIC codes to classify firms into a second group of banks, lenders, and bank holding companies that do not have primary dealer subsidiaries. This group comprises firms from SIC 60 commercial banks, SIC 61 nondeposit lenders, SIC 6712 bank holding companies, and a limited number of SIC 6211 securities brokers that are not primary dealers. Our third and last group of financial firms comprises insurers from SIC 6331 (fire, marine, and casualty insurance) and SIC 6351 (surety insurance). This group of insurers contains firms such as AIG and monoline insurers such as MBIA. 9 We exclude Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from our analysis since they are effectively government enterprises. When a primary dealer is a subsidiary of a larger company in CRSP, we group the firm with the primary dealers. Among firms without primary dealer subsidiaries, if the firm is a bank holding company with an insurance arm, we group it with bank holding companies.
Our primary variables of interest are compensation, size, and risk. We would ideally like to obtain a measure of the total dollar compensation paid to the manager. We focus on the total level of flow compensation to the manager as the best proxy for this ideal. Intuitively, measuring the flow pay to the manager best captures compensation practices of the principal, which is the spirit of the participation constraint. Alternatively, one can think of the cross-sectional variation in flow compensation as a proxy for cross-sectional variation in the total pay received in annuity over the tenure of the manager. Another potential measure could be the dollar value of the manager's accumulated cash payouts plus accumulated ownership stake in the firm. But this measure is potentially contaminated by the manager's individual portfolio decisions and hence could be subject to behavioral biases (Malmendier and Tate (2005) ).
We measure total flow compensation by averaging the total direct compensation (TDC1 in ExecuComp) across the top five executives at each firm; we label this variable Executive Compensation.
10 Total direct compensation includes bonus, salary, equity and option grants, and other forms of annual compensation. We exclude pay in years associated with IPOs since pay during those periods often involves one-time startup stock grants that are less relevant for persistent compensation practices.
We measure effective insider ownership as the total effective number of shares owned by the top five executives, where we include delta-weighted options using the method described in Core and Guay (1999) , divided by the total number of shares outstanding. This variable, which we label Total Insider Ownership, corresponds to the Jensen and Murphy (1990) dollar-dollar measure of incentives. 11 We compute Market Capitalization in a year as shares outstanding times price as of the fiscal year-end reported in Compustat. Total Assets are the total book assets of the firm.
In addition to compensation and size, we also calculate risk variables for every firm-year. We compute two main measures of risk: the annual beta of the firm's stock (Beta), and the firm's annualized stock return volatility (Return Volatility). We compute a firm's market beta and return volatility using the CRSP Daily Returns File, and take our market return to be the CRSP valueweighted index return including dividends. Our data on the risk-free return comes from Ken French's website. In computing betas and volatility, we require 60 days of returns, and we follow Shumway (1997) in our treatment of delisting returns. For firms with dual-class stock such as Berkshire Hathaway, we compute a firm-level measure of risk by first value-weighting returns across stocks each day.
To be in our final panel, we require that a firm-year have a full set of data for executive compensation, total insider ownership, market capitalization, and total assets for the fiscal year, as well as beta and volatility from the previous 10 Firms occasionally report the compensation of more than five people, in which case we take the top-five highly paid executives. Firms also occasionally report compensation of fewer than five people. Because firms that report less than five executives may not be strictly comparable to firms that report compensation of the top five (the vast majority of the sample), we rerun our analysis using top-five compensation only when five executives report compensation. Results are very similar.
11 The literature has suggested many different functional forms for incentive slopes. Jensen and Murphy (1990) use effective inside ownership (share ownership plus delta-weighted options) as a measure of incentives, which corresponds to the dollar gain in executive wealth per dollar increase in shareholder value. One concern is that different measures of incentives may be appropriate under alternative assumptions. Baker and Hall (2004) and Hall and Liebman (1998) suggest using the market value of insider equity as a measure of incentives, a "dollar-percent" measure. Results remain unchanged when using this measure of ownership. fiscal year.
12 With the exception of variables that have clear upper and lower bounds such as institutional ownership and the G Index, we winsorize our variables at the 1% and 99% levels within each cross-section to mitigate the effect of outliers.
Summary statistics for these compensation and size variables for our full panel are reported in Table I . The mean Executive Compensation is 2.82 million dollars with a standard deviation of 4.76 million dollars. The mean Total Insider Ownership is around 4% with a standard deviation of 7%. The mean Market Capitalization in our panel is 9 billion dollars with a standard deviation of 23 billion dollars. The mean Total Assets is 55 billion dollars with a standard deviation of around 150 billion dollars. All dollar amounts are adjusted to real December 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index All Items series.
Summary statistics for our risk variables are also reported in Table I . The mean Beta in our panel is 0.92 with a standard deviation of 0.42. The mean Volatility is 0.30 with a standard deviation of 0.13. We also use leverage to examine whether compensation is related to financial risk or asset risk. Following Adrian and Shin (2009), we compute leverage for our finance firms as the book assets-to-equity ratio, where we measure book equity as total stockholder equity in Compustat. The mean leverage is 10.8 with a standard deviation of 5.6. Table I also summarizes a series of standard productivity variables. In particular, Return on Assets is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation over total book assets, which averages 2%, and Asset Turnover (revenue divided by total assets) measures the revenue-generating efficiency of assets and averages 16%. 13 We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in our computation of total factor productivity by regressing the log of total revenue on the log of the total wage bill (less total payouts to executives) and the log of total assets within each finance subindustry-year, and retaining the percentile rank of the residuals of this regression within each industry-year as TFP Percentile Ranking. By construction, the median of TFP Percentile Ranking is 50%.
We obtain data on corporate governance from RiskMetrics, including the G index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ) and the percentage of directors that are outsiders (classified as "Independent" by RiskMetrics). The fraction of outside directors averages 67%, although these data only go back to 1997. We 12 Our timing is based on a variation of that in Fama and French (1992) . We match Compustat records for fiscal year t with betas and volatilities computed using returns from July of calendar year t − 2 to June of calendar year t − 1. Our convention is conservative in that it ensures that the betas and volatilities matched to fiscal year t are based on returns before the first possible set of 12 contiguous calendar months ending in that fiscal year. Given the Compustat convention of fiscal years, this set is July of calendar year t − 1 through June of calendar year t.
13 A very small number of firm-years in our sample have negative revenue due to the accounting of losses for financial firms. For example, AMBAC had negative revenue in both 2007 and 2008 due to substantial losses on credit derivatives. Results using revenue net of interest costs are similar. obtain data on the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) ) from Lucian Bebchuk's website. Our data on analyst coverage and institutional ownership come from I/B/E/S and the Thomson Reuters 13F database, respectively, where we match to CRSP using CUSIPs. For Thomson data, we take care to ensure that holdings and shares outstanding both reflect stock splits when necessary. The average number of analysts covering a firm-year in our panel is 13, and institutional ownership averages 51%.
We also report the average fraction of total pay represented by each type of pay from ExecuComp. On average, salary is 36% of total pay, while option grants and bonuses represent 24% and 20%, respectively.
14 The fraction of total insider ownership captured through share ownership and option ownership (delta-weighted) is also reported. On average, shares represents 57% of inside ownership, while options represent 43%.
In Panel B, we report Executive Compensation and Market Capitalization by finance subindustry to get an idea of the heterogeneity of firms in our sample. These statistics clearly reveal that primary dealers have much higher pay and are much larger than both the bank holding companies and insurers. For instance, the mean Executive Compensation for primary dealers is 13 million dollars compared with 2 million dollars for the other two types of financial firms. Not surprisingly, Market Capitalization is also much larger, at 44 billion dollars compared with 6 billion for bank holding companies and 10 billion for insurers. We are thus careful to control for this subindustry heterogeneity in our analysis below.
In Panel C, we report summary statistics for our origin risk measuresfirm risk measured in the year that the firm first went public or was newly listed. Our data on IPO dates come from Jay Ritter's website. Since these data cover only a subset of the financial firms in our sample, we supplement this information by taking the first date the stock is available in the CRSP files, following Fama and French (2004) , avoiding the dates when CRSP began coverage for different exchanges. 15 We compute the firm's beta with the CRSP Value-Weighted Index and stock return volatility using daily data in the 365 calendar days starting with the IPO date. The mean and median IPO year of firms in our sample is 1987. The oldest firm has an IPO year of 1933 and the youngest firm has an IPO year of 2006. We are able to compute origin risk measures using the procedure above for 260 firms. The average origin beta is 0.56 while the average origin volatility is 0.34 on an annualized basis.
III. Results

A. Calculating Residual Compensation and Residual Risk
In Table II , we regress firms' executive compensation on their size and finance subindustry in the cross-section, where we use the market capitalization of each firm's equity as a proxy for its size. We obtain residual compensation, our dependent variable of interest, from this regression. Controlling for heterogeneity in size and industry is important since our predictions about pay levels only hold for firms of equal scale or capital within an industry.
Ideally, we would like to control for heterogeneity by allowing not only average pay to vary across finance subindustries, but also the linear slope of compensation and size to vary across each of the three subindustries. 16 Unfortunately, the limited number of primary dealers per year does not allow us to reliably estimate the relationship between compensation and size separately 15 This is an imperfect proxy for a firm's actual IPO date, as a firm may go public on markets not covered by CRSP during certain time periods. A firm may go public on a market not covered by CRSP and then list on a major exchange covered by CRSP later in its life, as discussed by Fama and French (2004) . Our approach measures risk as far back in time as possible. We discard the extreme cases in which the first date a firm appears in CRSP is the date (±1 day) in which CRSP begins coverage of a major exchange. For example, a number of firms first appear in CRSP on December 14, 1972-the date when CRSP added NASDAQ to its coverage-even though they went public before that date. Including the "origin year" of these firms would result in a clustering of its distribution around years such as 1972. This is the main reason we compute origin risk for 260 firms instead of the full sample.
16 Murphy (1999) documents substantial heterogeneity in how pay scales with size across nonfinancial industries. We view our three groups as a rough split among firms that engage in investment banking and intensive trading activity, other banks that operate more as commercial banks and lenders, and financial insurers.
Table II
Residual Compensation
Panel A reports results from cross-sectional regressions of log executive compensation as the dependent variable on industry-specific size and level effects for three sample years, 1994, 2000, and 2006 , as well as a pooled panel regression with year effects. Panel B reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional quintile ranking of residual compensation for firms prominent in the financial crisis. Panel C reports correlations of residuals computed from projecting the listed variables on industry-specific size and level effects, within each sample year. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are computed using HC3 robust standard errors for the first three columns of Panel A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in column 4. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 17 Instead, we assume that the slope between compensation and size is the same for primary dealers and banks. For each cross-section, we estimate the following specification using OLS:
where LogComp i is the log of executive compensation, industry(i) is the industry of firm i (primary dealer, bank, or insurer, with bank as the omitted category), LogSize i is the log of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year, and Insurer i is an indicator for whether the firm is an insurer. This specification allows for heterogeneity in the average level of pay across subindustries and for an insurer-specific slope in the relationship between compensation and size within each cross-section.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table II , Panel A report OLS estimates for three crosssections: 1994, 2000, and 2006. 18 Pay scales with size, as suggested by talent assignment models such as Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011) , and estimates of the elasticity of pay with size are stable in all three cross-sections: 0.50 in 1994, 0.47 in 2000, and 0.58 in 2006. The elasticity for insurers is consistently slightly lower.
19 Column 4 pools together all crosssections from 1992 to 2008 and estimates a regression with pooled coefficients. Consistent with the stable relationship observed in the three cross-sections, the pooled coefficient on size is 0.49, with a pooled R 2 of 0.62. Overall, we conclude that we are able to reasonably purge out size and subindustry effects on executive compensation.
We measure the residual of compensation after estimating equation (8) These plots in Figure 1 also display the ticker symbol of some of the wellknown finance firms in our sample. Focusing on the recent sample in Panel B, 17 In particular, the estimate of the slope of compensation and market capitalization fluctuates depending on the year in which the regression is run due to changes in the composition of the primary dealer group. Consistent with this, running a regression that allows for slopes and intercepts to vary across all subindustries yields a large standard error on the slope for primary dealers.
18 Heteroskedasticity is an a priori major concern since we suspect substantial heterogeneity among banks, insurers, and primary dealers. We use HC3 standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity but have much better small-sample properties than the usual Huber-White sandwich estimator, as documented in MacKinnon and White (1985) and Long and Ervin (2000) . For pooled regressions, we cluster standard errors by firm.
19 Dropping Berkshire Hathaway, an influential observation, from our analysis reduces the magnitude of the difference between the insurer-size coefficient and the primary dealer/banksize coefficient, although the statistical significance of this difference increases in column 4. The remaining results are nearly identical. Table II , Panel B reports cross-sectional quintile rankings for several large financial firms, now averaged across all years a firm appears in our sample. High-residual compensation firms include Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide, and AIG. The low-residual compensation firms include JP Morgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway. At least superficially, our residual compensation measure seems to be informative of the firms that performed poorly in the crisis (e.g., Bear Stearns) versus those that performed better (e.g., JP Morgan Chase). It is perhaps this superficial correlation that might be guiding the view that pay caused risk.
We also compute analogous measures of residual beta and volatility by replacing the left-hand-side variable of equation (8) with each of our risk measures, including the origin risk measures. 20 The logic of calculating residual risk for each firm is the same as for compensation as our theory applies to firms of equal scale and subindustry type.
Correlations of these residual compensation and risk measures in Table II , Panel C illustrate the flavor of our results. Residual compensation is strongly correlated with residual compensation in the previous year, with a correlation of 0.70. Residual risk measures are also strongly persistent. The correlation of residual beta (volatility) with residual beta (volatility) in the previous year is 0.67 (0.61); even with beta (volatility) measured at origin, this correlation persists at 0.36 (0.26). As we will show below, this suggests that pay and risk are largely permanent firm effects.
More importantly, residual compensation is correlated with residual risk in the previous year; this correlation is 0.30 for beta and 0.25 for volatility. Residual compensation is also correlated with residual origin beta and volatility, with correlations of 0.22 and 0.20, respectively. These correlations motivate our empirical analysis below. They suggest that one should not be hasty in jumping to the conclusion that pay causes risk on the basis that firms that performed poorly in the crisis, like Bear Stearns, had high residual compensation. The fact that residual origin risk and residual risk in the previous year are correlated with residual compensation today suggests that causality might run the other way.
B. Persistence in Residual Compensation and Residual Risk
In Table III , we begin to build our case that causality might actually run the other way by establishing the premise of our model, which is that there are fixed firm differences in risk, even going back to when the firms were first born. To do so, one could show that there is persistence in residual compensation 
Persistence in Compensation and Risk
Panel A reports results from a pooled regression of residual compensation on previous-year residual compensation, CEO turnover, and excess returns. Panel B reports results from a pooled regression of residual beta and residual volatility on lagged residuals as well as residual origin beta and residual origin volatility measured in the origin year of the firm. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in both panels. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. . In our analysis, we set our bar a bit higher by running a horse race between these lagged values with other factors that might explain compensation such as CEO turnover and firm performance. The baseline coefficient of a regression of residual compensation on the previous year's residual compensation in column 1 is 0.71 with an R 2 of 0.491. This is very similar to the correlation reported in Table II , Panel C, indicating that the standard deviation of residual compensation is very similar across crosssections. 21 Column 2 adds an indicator for whether there was CEO turnover in the previous year and the previous year's excess stock return over the CRSP value-weighted index return as additional control variables, where we measure CEO turnover using dates when CEOs left office recorded in ExecuComp.
22
CEO turnover has a statistically significant coefficient of −0.096 while excess returns have a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.067. These effects have an economic significance of 0.16 and 0.04 standard deviations of residual compensation, respectively. When using forced CEO turnovers as indicated by ExecuComp (column 3), the magnitude of turnover's effect is similar, although statistical significance is weakened. However, in both cases, the increase in R 2 over column 1 is marginal. Furthermore, columns 4 to 7 demonstrate that, although CEO turnover and returns can have effects on changes (and absolute changes) in residual compensation, they explain very little of the overall variation in these changes. Figure 2 , Panel A illustrates this point. We sort firms each year into deciles of residual compensation and then compute the average residual compensation for each decile in the next year. The figure reveals a monotonic increasing pattern. After double-sorting independently by residual compensation and CEO turnover, this pattern persists both within the set of firms that did not experience CEO turnover and those that did experience CEO turnover. After double-sorting independently by residual compensation and excess returns, average residual compensation in the next year is monotone increasing across deciles of residual compensation in the current year, both within the lowest and highest deciles of excess returns. The Internet Appendix tabulates the means underlying Figure 2 and shows that, within each of these sets of firms, the spread of residual compensation the following year between the 1st and 10th deciles of residual compensation in the current year is significant at the 1% level. 23 We conclude that, while CEO turnover and stock price performance have some explanatory power for changes in residual compensation, the bulk of 21 Due to noise in the data, the correlation will never be one due to regression to the mean even in the presence of a true fixed effect in compensation. 22 In computing the previous year's returns and in classifying whether a firm experienced CEO turnover in the previous year, we follow the same timing convention as used to compute beta and volatility noted above. 23 The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article. explanatory power for today's residual compensation is provided by past residual compensation. As such, we interpret our residual compensation measure as being largely a permanent effect, and we conclude that there is substantial cross-sectional variation in this residual compensation measure. Our results are consistent with Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) , who suggest that firm effects dominate the variation in a number of corporate policies, and that, to the extent managerial effects can be detected in the data through CEO turnover, they too are largely explained by endogenous changes in corporate policies requiring new management. We also examine the persistence of our risk-based variables in Table III , Panel B, where we relate residual risk to residual risk from the previous year. The evidence strongly suggests that risk is correlated with risk in the previous year, as well as with origin risk. Figure 3 plots average risk residuals (beta and volatility) the following year for firms sorted into risk residual deciles. These values are also tabulated in the Internet Appendix. For both beta and volatility, there is a monotone increasing pattern. Our results suggest that both pay and risk are persistent effects and that each variable is a source of substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity. 
C. Residual Compensation and Residual Lagged or Origin Risk
With the premise of our model established, we turn to testing our first prediction (Prediction 1): firms with higher lagged or origin risk should have higher total compensation when the degree of incentive provision (i.e., insider ownership) does not vary with lagged or origin risk. We relate residual compensation, incentive provision, and residual lagged risk by estimating the following specification in the full panel using OLS:
where Risk i,t−1 is either beta or volatility measured in the previous year. Our coefficient of interest, β, measures the cross-sectional relationship between risk in the previous year and compensation, where the effect is pooled across cross-sections in the panel, net of interacted size and industry effects within each year. This approach is equivalent to a univariate regression of residual compensation as the left-hand-side variable on residual lagged risk as the right-hand-side variable, where residuals are computed using equation (8) for each cross-section. 24 We also estimate equation (9), where we substitute insider ownership as the left-hand-side variable. We cluster standard errors by firm. Table IV , Panel A highlights that there is little evidence of a negative relationship between insider ownership and lagged risk, yet a strong positive relationship exists between compensation and lagged risk. Columns 1 and 2 show that the relationship between compensation and lagged risk is statistically significant at the 1% level for both beta and volatility. The economic magnitude of these relationships is 0.27 and 0.24 standard deviations of compensation per standard deviation of beta and volatility, respectively. 25 These relationships hold consistently throughout our panel, as shown by Figure 4 , which plots the relationship between residual compensation and residual lagged beta (Panel A) and volatility (Panel B) for two cross-sections, 1994 and 2000. Columns 3 and 4 show little evidence of a relationship between ownership and risk. If anything, the relationship between ownership and volatility is positive, not negative.
Importantly, these relationships continue to hold even substituting origin risk for lagged risk in equation (9), as shown in columns 5 to 8. The economic significance of the relationship between compensation and origin risk is 0.23 standard deviations for beta and 0.21 standard deviations for volatility, respectively. The relationship between ownership and origin risk is also positive and statistically significant, rather than negative.
The results in Panel A are consistent with our hypothesis that, since exogenously riskier firms provide similar incentives for their managers (insider ownership does not vary significantly with lagged risk), their managers face more stock price risk and hence require higher total pay to offset the risk they are bearing relative to working at a less risky firm.
We check the robustness of our linear specifications in Panel A by conducting a more nonparametric analysis in Table IV , Panel B, where we compute average residual compensation in year t + 1 and residual ownership in year t + 1 by deciles of residual risk sorted in year t. Residual compensation exhibits an increasing pattern, suggesting that these results are not an artifact of linearity. Consider the first column, where average residual compensation is computed by deciles of residual beta. Residual compensation is −0.258 in the lowest decile and rises almost monotonically (except for deciles 4 to 6, where residual compensation is near zero) to 0.402 in decile 10. In contrast, there is no noticeable pattern in residual insider ownership across residual beta deciles in the second column. Similar patterns exist for risk measured using volatility in the third and fourth columns. In the Internet Appendix, we show that there is an increasing pattern in compensation over deciles of origin risk, and a relatively flat relationship for ownership. than the market value of equity, based on the idea that book asset values reflect both debt plus equity and thus constitute a better proxy for the scale of the firm. Results are very similar. Second, we add leverage as an additional variable in our regressions. To the extent that leverage increases the risk of equity, leverage may have a positive effect on compensation, which naturally leads us to ask whether our effects are being driven by leverage and financial risk or the risk associated with the firm's assets. Leverage has a weak positive effect on compensation, statistically significant at the 10% level for volatility. This suggests that financial and asset deviation of residual compensation. This measures a one standard deviation association in the direction orthogonal to size and industry. risk may both influence compensation, although asset risk has a much larger effect in our data. 26 Third, we exclude CEOs and find that non-CEO compensation and ownership is influenced by risk. Even after excluding the CEO, the economic significance of the relationship between compensation and risk in the previous year is 0.27 standard deviations. While ideally we would have data on compensation of other employees at financial firms (e.g., traders), whether our result would flip if we had such data on such employees depends on whether the relative ranking order of average pay would change substantially if we measured pay of employees other than executives. In any case, the persistence in residual compensation and the positive association between non-CEO executive compensation and risk suggest that residual compensation is more indicative of an overall firm effect.
D. Robustness Checks
Fourth, we conduct the same exercises for nonfinancial industries as an outof-sample check since the principal-agent theory relating compensation and risk should apply to nonfinancial industries as well. We focus on manufacturing industries as these span many subindustries that encompass a large portion of firms in Compustat. We estimate a variation of equation (9) where the subindustries are defined by the two-digit SIC codes between 20 and 39 and where size effects are fully interacted with subindustry group effects. We find a strong positive relationship between compensation and risk. We find a slight negative relationship between insider ownership and beta, but the economic significance is only −0.03 standard deviations. Although we are wary of the interpretation of these results since there is so much heterogeneity among nonfinancial firms, it appears that our insight regarding the relationship between total pay and firm risk holds generally.
Finally, in the Internet Appendix we repeat our analysis where we successively drop different groups of financial firms to see how our results vary across different subindustries. First, we exclude the primary dealers from our analysis and find consistent results across all our measures of risk. Second, because we are also concerned that the results may be driven by insurance companies, we repeat the analysis dropping insurers and again find similar results. Finally, we run our results using only banks and bank holding companies, excluding both insurers and primary dealers. Point estimates are remarkably stable across these different samples and show a statistically significant positive relationship between compensation and risk. Thus, our results are not just due to primary dealers or insurers.
E. Relating Risk and Productivity
We next turn to our second prediction (Prediction 2), that the productivity and riskiness of finance firms are positively related in the cross-section. We relate the accounting return on assets, asset turnover, and total factor productivity to our lagged risk measures by reestimating equation (9) using these productivity measures as left-hand-side variables. Table VI, Panel A reports these results.
The accounting return on assets measures the profitability of the firm per dollar of assets. Columns 1 to 4 show that return on assets is positively related to risk in the previous year and even origin risk. The coefficients on risk and origin risk are statistically significant at the 5% level or better, with economic significance in the 0.15 to 0.21 range for volatility and origin volatility. Examining asset turnover in columns 5 to 8 shows that much of the productivity gain of higher risk firms is due to earning more revenue per dollar of assets. Figure 5 , Panel A plots asset turnover residuals (net of subindustry and size factors) in year t + 1 across deciles of risk in year t, and shows that very risky firms have very high asset turnover. Overall, firms with higher stock price risk are also more profitable, supporting the idea that high-risk firms incentivize their agents just as strongly as low-risk firms.
We also look at the cross-sectional ranking of total factor productivity of each finance firm, measured as the percentile ranking of the residual from a cross-sectional within-subindustry regression of the log of revenue on the log of total wages paid (less executive pay) and the log of total assets each year. The idea is that the effect of CEO effort may be captured as a multiplicative effect on the contribution of employees and capital to production. Columns 9 to 12 report the results of regressing this percentile ranking on lagged risk and origin risk. Consistent with our results above, the relationship between total factor productivity and risk is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level when measuring risk using lagged beta, lagged volatility, and origin beta. The point estimate for origin volatility is positive but not statistically significant. Figure 5 , Panel B also confirms that these total factor productivity rankings in year t + 1 are increasing in risk deciles computed in year t. In the Internet Appendix, we tabulate average return on assets, asset turnover, and total factor productivity rankings by risk and origin risk deciles and consistently find an increasing relationship.
We next consider a multiple regression of compensation on risk and productivity. There are two potential outcomes from this regression. The first outcome is that risk displays a negative coefficient when controlling for our productivity measures. Assuming that risk residualized for current productivity is noise, it ought to be negatively correlated with ownership and compensation. The second outcome is that both risk and productivity measures come in with a positive sign if firms pay managers to manage growth options. Why? While growth options are a bit outside the scope of our model, the literature has supported a link between growth options, stronger incentives, and higher pay levels (Gaver and Gaver (1995) ), and also emphasizes that variation in firm risk is strongly correlated with variation in firm growth options (Bernardo, Chowdhry, and Goyal (2007) provide a review).
Intuitively, productivity is required not only today, but also in the future to manage growth opportunities, so high pay, high risk, and high future productivity may also go hand-in-hand. The difficulty in monitoring how agent effort 
Risk and Productivity
Panel A reports results from pooled regressions where the dependent variables are productivity measures and the independent variables are measures of risk. Columns 1 to 4 report results where the dependent variable is the accounting return on assets (ROA). The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 is asset turnover (revenue/assets); in columns 9 to 12, the dependent variable is the cross-sectional percentile ranking of total factor productivity (TFP). Panel B reports results regressing compensation and ownership as dependent variables on both lagged productivity measures and risk. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(8) 
(8) influences uncertain outcomes would then lead principals of growth firms to offer stronger incentives (Prendergast (2002) ). Growth options tend to increase total and systematic risk due to the longer duration of their cash flows (Dechow, Sloan, and Solimon (2004) ), their compound decision-making structure (Berk, Green, and Naik, (2004) ), and their general nature as an option on real assets (Chung and Charoenwong (1991) ). Indeed, the link between risk and growth options is robust across many classes of theories, even though there has been substantial empirical debate about whether traditional measures such as market-to-book or Tobin's q adequately capture growth options.
In our sample, we find that (1) ownership has a statistically insignificant yet positive coefficient with risk, and (2) compensation is positively correlated with both risk and current productivity, as shown in Table VI , Panel B. The coefficient on risk is statistically stronger than that for current productivity measures, which suggests that the second force-future productivity and growth-is a dominant factor in firms' pay-setting policies.
One possible interpretation of the correlation between growth options and risk in the context of finance firms is that expansion into subprime mortgage securitization and trading represented a growth option for firms such as Countrywide and Lehman Brothers. Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998) provide a case study showing how expansion decisions by banks operate as a growth option.
We should add the caveat, however, that mismeasurement of productivity is another possible explanation for these findings. The productivity measures we have, in contrast to the volatility of stock returns, are accounting-based and hence might be more subject to measurement error. With this caveat in mind, the evidence in Panel B of Table VI does strongly suggest an interpretation that risk and productivity are inextricably linked in financial services. Overall, we conclude that our analysis supports the notion that risk is intrinsically tied to firm output, leading to its positive association with compensation, as opposed to compensation causing risk.
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F. Residual Lagged Risk and the Components of Pay
In Table VII , we test our third prediction (Prediction 3) about how the components of compensation are related to risk. If compensation increases with risk because of the higher marginal productivity of agents at high-risk firms, the high value of their incentive shares should drive down salary as a fraction of total pay compared to agents at low-risk, low-productivity firms. We reestimate equation (9) and relate risk (beta and volatility) to the fraction of compensation represented by salary, bonus, total cash (salary plus bonus), restricted stock grants, and option grants. 27 We have also tried to include traditional valuation ratios such as Tobin's q and market-tobook as measures of growth options along with our risk measures to explain ownership levels and compensation. Results vary depending which ratios are used, but we still find that risk comes in with a positive sign, consistent with the idea that valuation ratios are noisy and associated with other concepts such as mispricing.
Table VII
Components of Pay
This table examines how the components of compensation are related to risk variables in the cross-section. The dependent variables examined are salary, bonus, total cash (salary plus bonus), restricted stock grants, and option grants, as a fraction of total compensation, and the independent variables are risk measures. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(8) Columns 1 and 2 show that firms with higher beta and volatility have lower salaries as a fraction of total pay. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in residual risk is associated with a 0.20 standard deviation, or 3%, reduction in salary as a fraction of total pay. Bonuses are a larger fraction of pay at high-risk firms (columns 3 and 4), so that the total cash pay (salary plus bonus) is flat with respect to risk (columns 5 and 6). Restricted stock grants show little relationship to risk (columns 7 and 8). In contrast, option grants show a strongly increasing relationship with both beta and volatility (columns 9 and 10).
When using origin risk, the relationship between option grants and risk is not statistically significant. However, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the fraction of pay that is salary and origin risk, and a positive relationship between the fraction of pay that is bonuses and risk. These results are tabulated in the Internet Appendix.
Our mechanism emphasizes heterogeneity in firm risk, holding risk preferences the same across managers. An additional mechanism arises if we are willing to assume heterogeneity in risk preferences across managers. In particular, there would be an additional matching mechanism in which less riskaverse CEOs work for more risky firms, as it is less costly to incentivize less risk-averse CEOs with variable compensation. There is some support for this perspective in Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) , who find that risk-averse CEOs (elicited through survey questions) are more likely to be compensated by salary and less likely to be compensated by performance-related packages.
G. Accounting for Entrenchment Proxies
Table VIII tests whether the cross-sectional pattern in total pay and risk is explained by the entrenchment hypothesis (Prediction 4). First, we test whether standard proxies for managerial power π are correlated with total pay and risk by estimating equation (9) with compensation and risk as lefthand-side variables, and with lagged measures of governance and power as the right-hand-side variable of interest, maintaining all other controls, in separate equations. A positive coefficient on the managerial power variable would suggest that entrenchment has cross-sectional explanatory power for total pay; if it is also positively correlated with risk, it would suggest that our previous results are driven by omitted variable bias. Our measures of power are the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G Index and the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) E Index, as well as the percentage of independent directors on the board (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ). For the board independence measure, entrenchment would suggest a negative coefficient.
28 Of these, none shows any correlation with compensation or risk. 28 Another potential measure of entrenchment is the CEO Pay/Top 5 Total Pay variable of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) . The numerator is included in our left-hand-side variable while the denominator of this fraction is a scaled version of our left-hand-side variable and thus we do not include it in our analysis as it will exhibit a mechanical relationship with average executive compensation. In our sample, this measure is uncorrelated with beta and volatility.
Table VIII Entrenchment
Panel A reports results from pooled regressions of compensation, beta, and volatility on measures of governance, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership, including fully interacted year, subindustry, and size controls. Each cell is a separate regression from the dependent variable indicated in the column header on the independent variable indicated in the row label including year, subindustry, and size effects, as well as full interactions of all three. Within each cell, the first line reports the point estimate, the second line reports the t-statistic, the third line reports the number of observations/firms, while the fourth line reports the economic significance of the coefficient. Panel B reports results from a multiple regression of compensation and ownership as dependent variables with risk, governance, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership as independent variables. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in both panels. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We also test whether measures of monitoring and transparency are negatively related to compensation and risk. Ceteris paribus, entrenchment is more likely in firms where there are low levels of monitoring or transparency. Motivated by this rationale, we relate compensation and risk to measures of institutional ownership and analyst coverage instead of measures of shareholder rights. To the extent that institutional ownership may mitigate entrenchment, high-pay and high-risk firms should have lower institutional ownership.
29 If higher analyst coverage yields more transparency at a firm, then high-pay and high-risk firms should have lower analyst coverage. Institutional ownership exhibits a strongly positive, not negative, relationship with compensation and risk. Analyst coverage also exhibits a positive, yet slightly weaker, relationship with compensation and risk.
Second, we test whether including the "kitchen sink" of these measures mitigates the observed correlation between risk and compensation in Table VIII , Panel B. If entrenchment is driving our correlation between risk and compensation, including these measures should mitigate the previously estimated correlations in Table IV . We include the G Index, the percentage of independent directors, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership in addition to risk on the right-hand side. 30 The point estimates for risk are remarkably consistent with those in Table IV , and risk displays a strong economic and statistical significance. The additional explanatory power comes from analyst coverage and institutional ownership, which have positive, not negative, signs.
We also do not find that including the kitchen sink of these measures changes the relationship between ownership and risk. Consistent with Table IV, the relationship between ownership and risk is, if anything, positive. The strongest 29 The theme of institutional investors wanting certain firms to take more risks and having to give them incentives to do so is also echoed in Froot, Perold, and Stein (1992) and Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) . 30 We include only the G Index or the E Index since they are highly correlated by construction (the E Index covers a subset of measures in the G Index). Substituting the E Index for the G Index does not change the results. relationship between ownership and governance is through the board independence variable, which comes in with a negative sign in both origin risk and lagged risk specifications. This suggests that better-governed firms with more independent directors are associated with weaker, not stronger, incentives.
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Overall, our previous results are not driven by entrenchment or monitoring.
Finally, we consider the prediction of the entrenchment theory that firms with entrenched mangers should underperform as managers divert cash flows. If high pay reflects entrenchment, then high-pay firms should consistently underperform in the cross-section. Figure 6 tests this conjecture by examining whether residual compensation is related to subsequent cumulative excess returns. We condense our panel into two periods: an early period, where we relate residual average compensation in 1992-1994 to residual cumulative excess buy-and-hold returns from 1995 to 2000, and a late period, where we relate average compensation in 1998-2000 to cumulative excess buy-and-hold returns from 2001 to 2008. 32 The figure shows that high-residual compensation firms-"yesterday's heroes"-tended to do well over the 1995-2000 period, a 31 The G Index and analyst coverage results are weaker, which suggests conflicting results: worse governance (high G Index) is associated with lower ownership, but worse transparency (less analyst coverage) is also associated with higher ownership. Neither of these associations survive the stronger specification of using origin risk instead of lagged risk. 32 Cumulative excess returns are computed by subtracting the CRSP Value Weighted Index return (including dividend distributions) from the cumulative return of the firm over the period for which the firm is alive. For the early period, we residualize both average compensation and the cumulative excess return against average end-of-fiscal-year market capitalization in 1992-1994; similarly, we use 1998-2000 average fiscal-year-end market capitalization for the late period. To account for the timing of fiscal year-ends, we compute returns for the early period from June 1995 through May 2001, and returns for the late period from June 2001 through May 2009. R period when the market boomed, while they did poorly from 2001 to 2008, a period when the market did poorly. This is largely a consequence of high-pay firms also being higher beta firms in the cross-section; including their beta during these periods as a control variable in this regression eliminates the statistical relationship between compensation and subsequent returns.
IV. Conclusion
The debate about the relationship between compensation and risk has often focused on whether entrenchment led to managers with misaligned pay packages taking excessive risk. We show that total pay and risk can be naturally correlated even in a classical principal-agent model with exogenous firm risk where managers implement the optimal effort on behalf of shareholders and where entrenchment is absent. Our main insight is that, when the degree of incentive provision does not vary with firm risk, perhaps because agents in high-risk finance firms have to work just as hard if not harder than those in low-risk firms, then agents in high-risk firms face greater wealth uncertainty and hence have to be compensated with higher total pay. In short, our results suggest that firm risk seems to be a first-order determinant in the cross-section of which firms compensate their agents highly.
This alternative narrative emphasizes that managers must be compensated for working at high-risk firms. The entrenchment narrative generally implies that improving governance and reducing the wedge between the interests of management and shareholders would have helped limit risk in the system, and perhaps even have helped avoid the financial crisis. Our results have a dramatically different implication. Our paper suggests a need for broadening the scope of research on pay and risk beyond the pay-for-performance dimension into how contracts as a whole are related to risk in accordance with principal-agent theory. Intuitively, the optimal contract reflects both the incentive constraint and the participation constraint. Further work along these lines is likely to yield considerable insights.
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